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Abstract 
Building on the work of others this paper sketches out what a 
Foucauldian ‘education’ might look like in practice, considers some 
of the challenges, paradoxes and impossibilities with which such 
an ‘education’ would face us, and indicates some of the cherished 
conceits and reiterated necessities that we must give up if we take 
seriously the need for an education that fosters an orientation to 
critique and curiosity. Three elements of Foucault’s ‘philosophical 
ethos’ that might be translated into educational practices are 
addressed. First, fostering a learning environment that encourages 
experimentation. Second, enabling the development of an 
awareness of one’s current condition as defined and constructed 
by the given culture and historical moment. Third, encouraging an 
attitude or disposition to critique; a focus on the production of 
particular sorts of dispositions that would be valued and fostered. 
All of this raises issue about ‘the teacher’. 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this paper is modest. It is an attempt to explore some 
possibilities for what might be called a Foucauldian education. It 
draws from and builds upon a number of existing forays into the 
use of Foucault’s later work to think differently (penser autrement) 
about teaching and learning: (Chokr, 2009); (Infinito, 2003a); 
(Leask, 2011); (Allan, 1999); (Pignatelli, 1993); (Butin, 2001) 
among others. Nonetheless, the task is made particularly 
challenging in as much that the space in which to think differently, 
that Foucault’s critique intends to produce, is a space of 
transgression and experiment, not a space of prescription. Thus, 
what is offered here can only be some possibilities and starting 
points, provocations rather than firm proposals. The paper adds to 
an existing string of dots and temporary abutments.  There is also 
a problem regarding terminology – I use the terms pedagogy, 
curriculum and assessment and teacher, at points in the paper 
when there is no alternative to refer to aspects of educational 
experience while at the same time starting from a position of 
critique that seeks to displace these concepts and practices and all 
their connotations. 
The paper begins by outlining Foucault’s use of critique as ‘a 
means of maintaining mobility of mind and spirit; of avoiding a 
fixed, stabilized view of the ever-changing present; of maintaining 
a critical awareness of oneself and the place and time in which one 
resides’ (Batters, 2011: 1). Critique is a technology for clearing 
away things we take as natural and necessary, in order to begin 
elsewhere. Critique is also a tactic for establishing the contingency 
of truth, power and subjectivity. From that starting point the paper 
outlines the possibilities of refusal and self-formation as the basis 
of a pedagogy as ethico-politics - that is as self-formation - and 
curriculum as genealogy, and teaching as the fostering of the 
disposition of curiosity, before addressing the problem of the 
teacher and the teacher learner relation as form of a ‘parrhesiatic 
contract’.  The sections intertwine and overlap in various ways. 
Overall in educational studies there is a tendency to interpret and 
use Foucault as a philosopher of oppressions, drawing primarily on 
the work of his middle period and its focus on the problem of 
power, and in particular on Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1979). 
From this, the means of correct training, the panopticon, 
normalisation etc. are deployed to explore, or more often re-
describe, the processes of schooling, or the experience of teaching 
and learning, in terms of surveillance, classification and exclusion2. 
In this vein, some refer to Foucault’s ‘bleak’ and one-sided vision 
of modernity (e.g. (McNay, 2013) (Scheurich & Bell McKenzie, 
2005) or his analysis as revealing ‘the grim truth of the education 
process – namely, that it is a core element in the mechanics of 
modern disciplinarity’ (Leask, 2011: 59).Those are right and proper 
readings of and uses of Foucault, and ones that he acknowledged, 
but they are also partial. What is missing from such renditions is a 
proper sense of the purpose and thrust of Foucault’s analytical 
endeavours. That is, his intention to destabilise, to make things 
‘not as necessary as all that’. Foucault, as a philosopher of 
contestation and difference, seeks to undermine self-evidences 
and open up spaces for acting and thinking differently about our 
relation to ourselves and to others and identify and refuse and 
transgress the horizon of silent objectification within which we are 
articulated. Such critique enables us to recognise that the things, 
values, and events that make up our present experience ‘have 
been constituted historically, discursively, practically’ (Mahon, 
1992: 14), and indeed that the self, our subjectivity, is historically 
produced in and through technologies and relations of power - see 
below. The point here for Foucault is not simply to record mundane 
processes of ways in which we are made subject to rather it is a 
means of opening up possibilities of self formation. Foucault does 
not intend that his analyses produce an horizon of absolute 
subjection and domination but rather the opposite, an horizon of 
freedom, that is, as he put it: 
My role - and that is too emphatic a word - is to show people 
that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept as 
truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at 
a certain moment during history, and that this so-called 
evidence can be criticized and destroyed. (Foucault in 
Martin, Gutman, & Hutton, 1988: 9) 
Critique and freedom 
The essence of Foucault’s critique is a curiosity towards the arts of 
being governed and ‘all of those practices and discourses that 
seek to homogenise subjectivity, to make it uniform, and narrow 
the spoke of freedom’ (Milchman & Rosenberg, 2011: 12) – of 
which schooling would be a case in point. This is a permanent 
orientation of skepticism; ‘a mode of relating to contemporary 
reality’ (Foucault in Rabinow (1987: 39). This requires not just a 
‘gesture of rejection’ rather ‘we have to move beyond the outside-
inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers’ (ibid 45). These 
possibilities of freedom are more directly and clearly explored in 
the later Foucault, more precisely around 1980 he began to 
articulate a politics of the care of the self (Foucault, 2016). What I 
want to explore here is some ways this later work enables us to 
think education differently, in particular in relation to the concept of 
self formation.  That is, education as the production of a subject 
‘capable of turning back upon itself: of critically studying the 
processes of its own constitution, but also subverting them and 
effecting changes in them’ (Oksala, 2005: 165). Self formation in 
this sense is a starting point for experiments with an education or 
educations that do not simply reconstitute what has failed in the 
past. Starting with self formation enables and requires us to 
dismantle the tired and constraining imaginary architecture of 
schooling - curriculum, pedagogy and assessment - and their very 
particular grammar or meanings and concomitant social 
arrangements of space and time – that we call an education.  
 
Here, drawing on and using ideas and propositions adumbrated by 
a small group of Foucauldian constructivists (noted above), I will 
sketch out what a Foucauldian education might look like in 
practice, and consider some of the challenges, paradoxes and 
impossibilities with which it would face us, and indicate some of 
the cherished conceits and reiterated necessities that we must 
give up if we take seriously the possibility an education that fosters 
a permanent orientation to curiosity. However, to reiterate, if we 
wish to take up the later Foucault as a starting point for thinking 
education differently there is no template to follow, no guidelines 
for an educational programme, rather some poorly marked tracks 
and vague signposts that are starting points. Following Foucault’s 
style and ‘method’ what is offered is not a programmatic account of 
some alternative to what is. As he suggests we cannot conceive of 
alternatives within the discursive possibilities we current inhabit. 
We are bound by epistemic rules and closures that enable and 
constrain us to think within certain versions of what is and might be 
true – the conditions of possibility of modern thought, established 
practices of remembering and forgetting, an exteriority that is prior 
to any conscious activity of a meaningful subjectivity. As he 
explained: ‘I think that to imagine another system is to extend our 
participation in the present system’ (Foucault, 1997 p. 230).  
Furthermore, in seeking to think differently we must leave behind 
any desire to find a foundational metaphysics for critical action and 
strive to escape ‘the over-used, colonised lexicon of critical 
education’ (Zalloua, 2004: 239). Rather we must embrace ‘the 
power of strangeness’ and the inevitability of failure, and ‘resist the 
obscuring clarity of rational philosophical discourse’ (Carroll, 1982: 
181) and thus make both our present and our past alien to us. We 
must struggle with the idea of ourselves, as ‘both a discursively 
produced effect and a viable site of resistance’ (Zalloua, 2004: 
234). This is ethics as a practice rather than a plan, as ‘the kind of 
relationship you ought to have with yourself…’ (Foucault, 1983: 
263), a question of how we govern our own conduct, both our 
behaviour and our purposes, and the possibility of unending 
change both to ourselves and to the ‘arrangements’ in which we 
contingently find ourselves.  
 
Authoring one’s ethical self 
 
Foucault was adamant that there is no simple relationship between 
critique and action. The main task is as much or perhaps even 
more one of refusal as it is resistance. ‘Maybe the target nowadays 
is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are’ (Foucault, 
2000a: 336). This is a negative ethics, not a matter of asserting 
ideals, but rather an aestheticism – an imaginative creativity. This 
is a form of ethico-politics that is visceral rather than abstract, 
rooted as much in the physical and emotional as it is in logic. It 
rests on a refusal to accept the grounds on which subjectivity is 
proposed within dominant discourses and a willingness to subvert 
them – a subversion that is transformative rather than just 
disruptive. This creativity focuses on the care of the self and of 
others, and involves both the techne of the self and the techne of 
life. It is the cultivation of a self that is on the one hand a product of 
and a disruption of various discourses and on the other the 
practice of the art of living well, living differently, relating to others 
in different ways. This is the construction of a heterotopia 
(Tamboukou, 2006) both intellectual and practical, in which space 
and time are are somehow 'other': disturbing, intense, 
incompatible, contradictory or transforming, and within which it is 
possible to make oneself thinkable in a different way – to become 
other than how you find yourself – that is, a search for ‘other’ 
experiences3. In these respects self-formation is an active and 
engaged process, based on questioning and learning from the 
immediate and quoditian, on forming and testing at the same time; 
an ‘exercise of oneself in the activity of thought’ (Foucault, 1992: 
9). 
 
All of this would involve a plurality of refusals, resistances and 
struggles against local fixations of power in specific sites, in part 
through ‘counter-conducts’ (Davidson, 2001) (Meade, 2014) and 
creative strategies of non-compliance that then open up 
possibilities of ‘autonomous and independent subjectivation, that 
is, possibilities for the constitution of oneself’ (Lazzarato, 2009: 
114). Counter conducts are active interventions in the ethical 
domain, refusals to be governed this way, the cultivation of the arts 
of ‘voluntary insubordination, and a practice of reflective 
intractability’ (Foucault, 1997: 32). Such practices of refusal show 
us that ‘the production of something new in the world might be 
possible’ (Deleuze, 1991:163). They are vehicles or opportunities 
for exploring new forms of existence, of being ‘otherwise’.  
 
Refusal offers the potential for a re-politicisation of everyday life by 
re-opening to question the taken for granted and naturalised 
concepts, practices, relations and social arrangements through 
which we relate to ourselves and to others. However, by 
denaturalising the categories that organise and define our 
experience, and make us what we are, we enter into a worrying, 
indeed frightening space in which we must ‘un-think’ our common 
sense and recognise as fragile and contingent many of our 
modernist certainties. In this way be might begin to recognise that 
all knowledge is uncertain; that truth is unstably linked to power, 
and that our intelligibility is constantly in question. The task is to 
eschew certainty in order to become an ironic hero of our own life 
by ‘tak(ing) oneself as object of a complex and difficult elaboration’ 
(Foucault in Rabinow 1987: 166). We engage in unmaking our 
selves and what we have become and thus at the same time make 
intolerable the institutions and experiences within which our 
intelligibility is constructed. In other words, our subjectivity 
becomes a site of political struggle (Ball & Olmedo, 2013). 
 
To sum up: what is involved here is a creative and aesthetic 
politics that is not reliant on the pre-given, tainted, moral principles 
that we take to define humanity, or which require us to search for 
and link our essential qualities to inherent abstract principles. 
Instead one is set the challenge ‘of creatively and courageously 
authoring one’s ethical self’ (Foucault, 1977: 154).  
 
… it is a question of searching for another kind of critical 
philosophy. Not a critical philosophy that seeks to determine 
the conditions and the limits of our possible knowledge of the 
object, but a critical philosophy that seeks the conditions and 
indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, 
transforming ourselves. (Foucault 1997: 179)  
 
What is at stake here is the ‘arrangements’ that have created the 
modern subject. The point is to make these arrangements 
untenable and unacceptable and to begin to establish the 
conditions for the creation of new modes of subjectivity. ‘And in 
this case, one of the main political problems nowadays would be, 
in the strict sense of the word, the politics of ourselves’ (Ibid 213). 
The question is then how might this translate into something we 
might conceive of as an education?  
 
Education as Self-formation  
 
Leask (2011: 57) argues that if we take seriously the focus on the 
practices of education in the later Foucault then: 
 
… instead of being rendered into factories of obedient 
behaviour, schools or colleges can be the locus for a 
critically informed, oppositional micro-politics. In other words: 
the power-relations that (quite literally) constitute education 
can now be regarded, on Foucault’s own terms, as being 
creative, “enabling” and positive.  
 
That is, we can re-think education in ways that respond to 
Foucault’s question ‘how could it be possible to elaborate new 
kinds of relationships to ourselves” (Berkeley Lecture 1). (U-
Tube)? Indeed, Butin (2006: 371) suggests that there is ‘a 
seemingly natural affinity between Foucault’s insights – into, for 
example, power, knowledge, resistance, subjectification – and 
educational research and practice’ and Leask (2011: 67) argues 
that in Foucault’s later work there are possibilities which indicate 
that pedagogy can be reconsidered not simply as a technique for 
the manufacture of imposition but as ‘the theatre of subject 
creation, of new “practices of the self”, new kinds of relations – 
especially via continued resistance to domination’. Leask also 
suggests that ‘teachers and students alike can now be regarded as 
creative agents, capable of voluntary and intentional counter-
practices….’ (67). This is what Infinito (2003a) calls ‘a political 
pedagogy’. She identifies from Foucault’s essay What is 
Enlightenment? (Foucault, 2000b) three elements of the 
‘philosophical ethos’ - a type of philosophical interrogation - that is, 
three different aspects involved in working on oneself, that might 
be translated into educational practices, although she goes on to 
say: ‘How these technologies are applied and what they might look 
like specifically in daily life or in the classroom are important 
questions that call for further theoretical analysis and practical 
application …’ (2003: 165)4. 
 
First, fostering a learning environment that encourages 
experimentation. Here the classroom is an ethical space, a political 
space, and a concrete space of freedom. Second, as outlined 
above, enabling the development of an awareness of one’s current 
condition as defined and constructed by the given culture and 
historical moment. Third, again as outlined above, encouraging an 
attitude of critique with a focus on the production of particular sorts 
of dispositions that would be valued and fostered, made explicit 
(questions of subjectivity) – like skepticism, detachment, outrage, 
intolerance and tolerance. This would involve the valuing and 
facilitating both what Olssen (2009) calls ‘difference’, as the basis 
of ‘thin’ community, and audacity and fearlessness.  
Spaces of education 
As a framework for educational practice the first precept suggests 
the need to attend to the form and nature of the spaces of 
education - the setting, its frames and practices, and its 
architecture. Self-formation here, in the very immediate sense, 
requires spaces where our actions as learners are attended to, 
carefully considered and taken seriously enough to merit a 
response. This would be a space in which agonism would be 
valued and failure would be a constructive opportunity to learn and 
to change – both of which take time - the pace of education would 
need to slow down. In such a space it would always be possible to 
‘start again’ and who one is and what one thinks and to what one 
is committed to would remain tentative, open to revision5. Youdell 
(2011: 115) suggests that this means ‘intervening in the intolerable 
present to make “that-which-is”, ”no longer that-which-is” inviting 
us to imagine becomings that disrupt the intolerable … offering 
instead moments of the haecceity6 of “this thing’ or “here is”’. The 
aim would be to make 
 
the past come undone at the seams, so that it loses its unity, 
continuity, and naturalness, so that it does not appear any 
more as a single past that has already been made, but 
rather, as a heterogeneous array of converging and 
diverging struggles that are still on going and only have the 
appearance of having been settled. (Infinito, 2003a: 27).  
 
In this heterotopic space (and time) we must attend to frameworks 
of knowability and unknowability, at the same time, always bearing 
in mind that ignorance is formed by knowledge and vice versa. 
 
Genealogy as Curriculum/ curriculum as curiosity 
 
Infinito’s second condition for a political pedagogy suggests 
genealogy as curriculum and the centrality of the question of truth. 
In stark contrast to the modernist classroom the concern is not with 
what is true but with the how of truth. Knowledge becomes a 
problem rather than a question. As Infinito (2003a: 168) suggests: 
‘Here, we might imagine a curriculum designed to enable multiple 
genealogical investigations into many other human constructs and 
disciplines’. This is what Chokr (2009) calls an unlearning which 
rests on the question of ‘how should we govern ourselves’. 
Unlearning ‘should encourage students to think deeply and 
critically about the illusory world of all the ideas, notions, and 
beliefs that hem, jostle, whirl, confuse and oppress them’ and 
‘requires of them a reversal of standpoint’ (61). This would involve 
a view of knowledge as games of truth, and in relation to this ‘the 
collapse of objective meaning leaving us free to create our own 
lives and ourselves’ (Wain 2007: 173). This is a form of ‘combative’ 
or guerrilla pluralism’ in which there is no epistemic innocence 
(Medina, 2011: 30). 
 
What the guerrilla pluralism of the Foucaultian genealogical 
method can help produce is epistemic insurrections that 
have to be constantly renewed and remain always ongoing 
in order to keep producing epistemic friction. (Medina 2011: 
33). 
 
 ‘Dislocation’ and ‘decoding’, as Chokr (2009: 62) puts it, are 
necessary to place ‘in abeyance the propositions and assumptions 
underlying and governing understanding and behaviour’. To 
reiterate, this is not an abdication of truth but rather a self-
conscious engagement in the games of truth, destabilising truth 
rather than learning it, historising excellence and beauty rather 
than appreciating it - ‘a commitment to uncertainty’ (Youdell, 
2011). This might also involve the recovery of subjugated 
knowledges and thinking ‘tactically about the multiple effects of 
texts and classroom engagements’ (Code, 2007: 69) and drawing 
out and making ‘visible subjugated meanings and unsettle and 
open up to troubling those meanings that inscribe the normative’ 
(69). At the same time we must come to see and understand past 
subjects differently, by activating counter-memories. That is, a 
struggle against collective forgetting particularly in relation to social 
injustices. This might also involve a focus on the writerliness of 
texts and ‘de-naturalizing our habitual economy of reading’ and 
‘the consumerist model of reading’ (Zalloua 2004: 239). Rather, 
this is writing and ‘reading as a practical strategy in the constitution 
of the self’ (Ibid 234), two key technologies for the care of the self.  
 
Above all, this is a classroom in which the aim is to cultivate an 
orientation of curiosity – ‘a readiness to find what surrounds us 
strange and odd; a certain determination to throw off familiar ways 
of thought and to look at the same things in a different way … a 
lack of respect for the traditional hierarchies of what is important 
and fundamental’ (Foucault, 1980: 328)7. However, this is ‘not the 
curiosity that seeks to assimilate what it is proper for one to know, 
but that enables one to get free of oneself’ (Foucault, 1988b: 8). It 
relies on: ‘the knower’s straying afield of himself’. Curiosity is one 
means of loosening our relation to a fixed identity, creating the 
possibility of erring, of ‘no longer being, doing or thinking what we 
are, do, or think’ (Foucault: 47 in Rabinow 1987). ‘Curiosity is 
indeed what enables the student (the curious subject par 
excellence) to resist the powerful lure of ideological complacency’ 
(Zalloua 2004: 239) and to challenge and disrupt ‘the economy of 
the Same’ (ibid 242). 
 
A disposition of critique 
 
The third task and dimension of a political pedagogy is the 
cultivation of an attitude or disposition to critique and in relation to 
this there are certain qualities of character, like courage (Foucault, 
2011), which might be formed and might be needed here, not as 
abstract or self-managing dispositions, as currently intended by so-
called ‘character education’ (Dishon & Goodman, 2017) but as the 
basis for action and interaction in the spaces of learning. However, 
Infinito (2003a: 170) warns: 
 
Lest we think this a radical notion, we must remember that 
education is practiced at producing desirable dispositions. A 
history of the hidden curriculum reveals specific attitudes 
infusing education at various times, deemed part of its 
responsibility.  
 
The point here would be to encourage ethical teacher/learners who 
have a healthy suspicion of the present but who are also able to 
acknowledge their own fallibility. That is, ‘teachers’ and learners 
who are open to infinite possibilities for change and are willing to 
critique their own commitments. This would mean adopting a 
critical stance that oscillates between attempts to re-create 
ourselves and the world and in doing so ‘make ourselves 
vulnerable to the past’ (Medina 2011: 28) and ‘open ourselves up 
to interrogation’ (29).  
 
The ‘learning’ processes involved here may be part of what 
Zembylas (2015: 315-16) and others call a pedagogy of 
discomfort; drawing on what Foucault termed ‘the ethic of  
discomfort’ (Foucault, 2000a). That is, students and teachers are 
challenged to embrace their vulnerability and accept the ambiguity 
of self and their dependence on others (Zembylas, 2015: 170) and 
are constantly ‘”jarred” from their habitual everydayness’ (Chokra 
2009: 63). Teaching/learning thus becomes a series of crises, 
disruptions and impasses. Part of the pedagogical challenge for 
the ‘teacher’ is to create a social and ethical environment within 
which discomfort is productive. As Felman (1992: 53) argues: 
 
If teaching does not hit upon some sort of crisis, if it does not 
encounter either the vulnerable unpredictable dimension, it 
has perhaps not truly taught . . . I therefore think that my job 
as a teacher, paradoxical as it may sound, was that of 
creating in the class the highest state of crisis that it could 
withstand… 
Infinito (2003b: 75) discusses this in an explanation of the use of 
the ‘Blue-eyed-brown-eyed’ classroom event and writes of a 
‘struggle with the propriety of subjecting students unknowingly to 
ridicule and discomfort. At the same time, perhaps the most 
profound education is always discomforting’. The goal is to create 
a space within which it is possible to begin to confront and re-
imagine the historically sedimented questions and 
problem(atizations) through which we address the world. That is, a 
curriculum within which we can re-constitute our present – opening 
up ‘a room, understood as a room of concrete freedom, that is 
possible transformation’ (Foucault 1972: 5). Conceived and 
practiced in this way education becomes an exploration and 
mapping of limits, and testing and crossing them when possible – 
a set of multiple transgressions that allow ‘individuals to peer over 
the edge of their limits, but also confirms the impossibility of 
removing them’ (Allan, 1999: 48). Such experiences have ‘the 
function of wrenching the subject from itself, of seeing to it that the 
subject is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation or 
its dissolution. This is a project of desubjectivation’ (Foucault 
2000b p. 241). This is a sequence of moments, openings, spaces 
in which unlearning is possible – an exploration of ethical 
heterotopias, real and unreal, where difference is affirmed, ‘a sort 
of simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space in 
which we live’ 8.  In relation to this first and foremost, students 
must be recognized as ethical beings capable of reflection, 
decision-making and responsibility for their identity and their social 
relations. That is to say, ‘ethical self formation as moral pedagogy 
allows for the maintenance and production of the learners’ 
freedom’ (Infinito 2003b: 68). In a similar way, Sicilia-Camacho & 
Fernández-Balboa (2009: 458) recast critical pedagogy in 
Foucauldian terms and assert that: ‘Our version of CP (critical 
pedagogy) seeks the construction of personal-pedagogical-political 
ethics while acknowledging the legitimacy of different ‘pedagogical 
games’ and “regimes of truth’9. In these ways, education and 
pedagogy are articulated not as bundles of skills and knowledges 
but as the formation of moral subjectivity, a form of practical 
politics, a struggle to become self-governing. This is not liberation 
but activation, an enduring engagement in the travails and failures 
of self-fashioning, experimenting with and choosing what we might 
be and how we might relate to others. It is ethics as a ‘social 
praxis’, experiments with ‘forms, modes and styles of life’ (Infinito, 
2003b) and new social and political forms.  It is driven by failure 
and the need to ‘fail again’ but better, rather than the expectation 
of success or closure. It values the pluralisation and agonism of 
voices and contestation over consensus and resolution. It 
recognises that solutions give rise to new problems and rests of 
what Wenham (2013 ) calls ‘the tragic view of the world’, according 
to which conflict, suffering and strife are inevitable phenomena of 
social and political life and may never be ultimately overcome.  
Teaching here becomes a process of asking questions without 
providing answers, the goal is to explore ‘to what extent it might be 
possible to think differently (penser autrement)’ (Foucault, 1992: 9). 
It is education as epistemological suspicion. 
 
Education and unlearning become both enabling and destructive 
and ‘what is at stake is the production of a certain kind of 
experience, a reconfiguring of experience itself’ (Geuss, 2008: 9). 
This is different from CP, this is ‘a morality as action, recognizing 
individual’s capacity to develop alternative “subjectivities” and 
make appropriate decisions’ as distinct from CP as a ‘moral 
process whose goal is the emancipation of others’ (Sicilia-
Camacho & Fernández-Balboa 2009: 458).  
 
The problem of the teacher; ‘One always needs the help of others 
in the soul’s labour upon itself’ (Foucault, 1994).   
 
All of this, as Youdell (2011: 11) aptly puts it, is ‘fraught’ and begs 
difficult questions about what a learner and a teacher (or guide, 
mentor) are. Foucault sees no objection to ‘those who know more 
in a given game of truth’ telling another ‘what he must do, teach 
him’, the problem in this relationship and interaction is ‘to avoid the 
effects of dominance’ (Foucault, 1988a). In relation to which Biesta 
(2013) usefully distinguishes between ‘learning from’ and ‘being 
taught by’. There is a mutuality to the relations of power here, and 
in Self Writing10, Foucault quotes Seneca, saying ‘The process is 
mutual; for men learn while they teach’.  The bond between master 
and disciple, as Foucault puts it, is always provisional and 
circumstantial, a dialogue based on respect and mutual care, and 
mutual development, a relationship open to constant scrutiny and 
revision. The teacher here is a ‘genuine interlocutor’, some one 
who takes risks and relishes challenges, in order to create a public 
space where fearless speech is encouraged. All of this must rest 
on the relationship, for the teacher as much as the student, 
between care of the self and the care of others. And as Foucault 
points out in his survey of Greek political thought there is a 
fundamental relation between governing others and governing the 
self: ‘One will not be able to rule if one is not oneself ruled’ 
(Foucault, 1990: 89). The exercise of political power demands the 
practice and cultivation of personal virtues. ‘It is the power over 
self which will regulate the power over others … if you care for 
yourself correctly i.e., if you know ontologically what you are … 
then you cannot abuse your power over others’ (Foucault, 1988a: 
8). This can be transposed into the problem of pedagogical power 
and would re-envisage teaching as an ethical practice, and would 
mean constructing one’s relation to the learner differently, with a 
primary focus on attending to and facilitating their impulse of 
curiousity and making the classroom as site of ‘ethico-aesthetic 
self-fashioning’ (Zalloua 2004: 244) – organised and re-organised 
in relation to the problem of what kind of self am I going to be? As 
Foucault (1997: 300) remarks in order to care for the self, one 
needs a ‘master of care’, a guide, a counsellor, a friend and he 
counsels the need to offset ‘the dangers of solitude’ and as Olssen 
(2007: 207) makes clear: ‘Ethical action is not, for Foucault, an 
individual affair but presupposes a certain political and social 
structure with respect to liberty’. Self formation is not a lonely 
narcissism but is only possible within what Falzon calls ‘the 
fundamental encounter with the other’ (1998: 36), within which ‘our 
narcissistic reveries are shattered, the circle of our solipsism is 
burst’ (34). Here, the life we live among other subjects, as Infinito 
puts it, is ‘the stuff of ethics’, it is the fashioning of ‘a mode of being 
which emerges from our own history and thinking’ (2003a: 73). 
Clearly, refusing to be a ‘proper’ teacher means that the teacher is 
also vulnerable in the ‘classroom’, putting their subjectivity at risk. 
As Deacon (2006: 184) points out practices of liberty in the 
classroom ‘are inextricably intertwined with pedagogical effects of 
guilt, obligation and verification, and assumptions about degrees of 
ignorance, dependence on others, legitimate compulsion and 
achievement’. Here teaching and learning are a set of experiments 
that are both exciting and frightening, based on the ‘parrhesiatic 
contract’ – in which both parties speak frankly (Peters, 2003). The 
teacher has ‘the task of establishing a vital, vibrant public space for 
truth-telling to occur’ (Pignatelli 2002 p. 174). This is necessarily a 
very ‘concrete, palpable experience’ (Falzon 1998 p. 33), it is ‘the 
art of living dangerously’ (Allan 1999 p. 58). Emotions, intellectual 
risks and trust become intermingled in complex and difficult ways. 
Nonetheless, in these ways, teaching might become a site of 
‘delight in oneself’ (Foucault 1990: 65).  
 
In Greek politics the ability to govern was not defined ‘as if it were 
a question of a “profession” with its particular skills and techniques’ 
(Foucault, 1990: 91)  – which is how we have come to conceive of 
the work of the teacher – but rather depended on ethical work of 
the self on the self – that is the work of self formation. The point is 
not to ‘accept’, but to experiment to create, to think critically, to 
imagine, to make judgments about what it is we do not want to be 
and what it is we might want to be. This is both negative, a 
disavowal of the contingently normal, and positive, thinking 
differently about ourselves, a transgression, an agonism, a 
struggle that produces us as ethical beings, a disposition toward 
and constant activity of changing and an unending search for 
autonomy. The self becomes ‘autonomous’ only through ‘concrete 
possibilities which present themselves as invitations for the 
practice of liberty’ (Bemauer & Rasmussen, 1994: 71).  
 
From here to there? 
 
All of this begs many questions about how we get from where we 
are now – wedded to an education system that is absurd (Ball, 
2018) and oppressive and that conflates education with schooling 
– to the possibility of education as something different. How do we 
move from a system of education that rests on an assumption of 
ignorance and a reverence to the past, and that can only function 
through practices of exclusion and humiliation, to a form of 
education that eschews system altogether and offers no privilege 
to the past and rather consists of a process of creative self 
fashioning, the opening up of vulnerability, unruly curiosity, and 
frank speaking. A space of education that is not define defined and 
limited by an institutional rationale but part of and related to forms 
of self-fashioning carried out elsewhere and to the broader life of 
the citizen, in a ‘constant effort to expand the scope of new modes 
of subjectivity, by creating the space for the flourishing of a 
multiplicity of arts of living’ (Milchman & Rosenberg, 2011: 12)? 
The answer is, I do not know. What I can offer is some incitements 
towards ‘the critique of what we are and experiments with the 
possibility of going beyond’ (Foucault in Rabinow 1987 p. 108) that 
combines outrage with limit-testing and careful scholarship, and 
which cultivates ‘the art of voluntary insubordination, and a 
practice of reflective intractability’ (ibid 32). 
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Notes 
 
1 I am immensely grateful to Patrick Bailey, Matthew Clarke, Jordi Collet, and Donald Gillies for 
their careful, insightful and very constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.  
 
2 Foucault himself (2010: 3) refers to this early, middle, late periodization or rather signals the 
changing emphases in his analyses, from knowledge, to power, to subjectivity, that is ‘studying 
each of these three areas in turn’ (4), as moving from a focus on forms of knowledge, to the matrix 
of forms of behavior, to the constitution of the subject’s modes of being. 
3 As Tavani (2013) argues this involves a reading of the myriads of intermediate spaces hosted 
between the two poles of confirmation or subversion (see also (Foucault, 2006) 
4 One of many such developments would be to consider how self-formation might relate to 
primary and secondary schooling, unless of course such a division is rendered redundant by the 
work of critique, as I think it might. More challenging might be whether self-formation should be 
thought about in relation to developmental stages and for example Kohlberg’s theory of moral 
development (Kohlberg, 1981). But again we might want to take such a conception of the child 
subject as needing to be dispensed with entirely. 
 
5 And thus perhaps we have also to give up on linearity, the developmentalist conception of 
education. 
 
6 Which denotes the discrete qualities, properties or characteristics of a thing that make it a 
particular thing. 
 
7 Mahmood (2011) extolls the virtues of curiosity in a recent paper on the role of SATs in English 
education. 
8 “Des Espace Autres,” published by the French journal Architecture /Mouvement/ Continuité in 
October, 1984:     http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/foucault1.pdf. 
9 There is further work to be done here in teasing out the important differences between 
Foucault’s self-formation and more familiar versions of critical pedagogy which draw on Friere, 
Illich and others. (Biesta, 2017) is a helpful resource in this task. 
10 (Foucault, nd.) 
